The Court of Appeal has backed a council in a dispute about restrictions the local authority had imposed on parking permits for new residents.
This is the case of R (on the application of Khodari) & Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea & Anr 2017 EWCA Civ 333.
The appeal related to a judicial review where there was a section 106 agreement which required a proposed residential development to be ‘parking permit free’, and sought a fee for the council’s costs of monitoring parking.
The High Court had previously held that the requirements not to permit any owner or occupier to apply for a parking permit and to include a covenant to this effect in the subsequent leases, did not meet the requirements of section 106 of the Town & Country Planning Act 1990. So the section 106 agreement was invalid – including the monitoring fee.
The Court of Appeal agreed that the parking permit obligations were not a section 106 obligation but noted that the agreement was made under the council’s other statutory powers. Section 16 of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1974 was used and the court found that this could be relied on by the council to enforce the parking permit restrictions.
The ancillary monitoring fee, as a one-off payment and which was already paid, was not enforceable against successors in title and became a simple contractual obligation between the owner and the council under the other statutory powers listed.
This demonstrates that there are inventive ways for local planning authorities (LPA) to seek seemingly incompatible obligations. For LPAs outside of London, the court pointed out that the proposed residences could simply be excluded from the traffic regulation order relating to the controlled parking zone.
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